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The affirmative’s hegemony impact is reminiscent of the Algonquian monster, the Wendigo – insatiable and bloodthirsty, its only purpose is endless destruction as it struggles to maintain itself – in a similar way, hegemony is a constant process of enemy-creation – a paranoid politics towards the impossible telos of world domination – this politics is responsible both for every atrocity in the 20th century as well as the exacerbation of every modern geopolitical crisis

Cunningham 13 (Finian Cunningham, expert in international affairs specializing in the Middle East, former journalist expelled from Bahrain due to his revealing of human rights violations committed by the Western-backed regime, basically a badass, 3-11-13, “US Creates Nuclear Armed Cyber-attack Retaliation Force. Psychotic Superpower on a Hair Trigger,” <http://nsnbc.me/2013/03/11/us-creates-nuclear-armed-cyberattack-retaliation-force-psychotic-superpower-on-a-hair-trigger/>) gz

Since at least World War II, the genocidal propensity and practices of the US are proven, if not widely known, especially among its propagandized public. The atomic holocaust of hundreds of thousands of civilians at Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the beginning of the long shadow cast upon the world by this deranged superpower. For a few decades, the crazed American giant could hide behind the veil of the «Cold War» against the Soviet Union, pretending to be the protector of the «free world». If that was true, then why since the Cold War ended more than 20 years ago has there not been peace on earth? Why have conflicts proliferated to the point that there is now a permanent state of war in the world? Former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan have melded into countless other US-led wars across Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The «War on Terror» and its tacit invocation of «evil Islamists» have sought to replace the «Cold War» and its bogeymen, the «evil communists». But if we set aside these narratives, then the alternative makes compelling sense and accurate explanation of events. That alternative is simply this: that the US is an imperialist warmonger whose appetite for war, plunder and hegemony is insatiable. If the US had no official enemy, it would have to invent one. The Cold War narrative can be disabused easily by the simple contradictory fact, as already mentioned, that more than 22 years after the collapse of the «evil» Soviet Union the world is no less peaceful and perhaps even more racked by belligerence and conflict. The War on Terror narrative can likewise be dismissed by the fact that the «evil Islamists» supposedly being combated were created by US and British military intelligence along with Saudi money in Afghanistan during the 1980s and are currently being supported by the West to destabilize Libya and Syria and indirectly Mali. So what we are left to deduce is a world that is continually being set at war by the US and its various surrogates. As the executive power in the global capitalist system, the US is the main protagonist in pursuing the objectives of the financial-military-industrial complex. These objectives include: subjugation of all nations – their workers, governments and industries, for the total economic and political domination by the global network of finance capitalism. In this function, of course, the US government is aided by its Western allies and the NATO military apparatus. Any nation not completely toeing the imperialist line will be targeted for attack. They include Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba and North Korea. In the past, they included Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Grenada, Nicaragua, Chile and Panama. Presently, others include Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Mali undergoing attack operations. The difference between covert and overt attack by the US hegemon is only a matter of degrees. The decades-long economic sanctions on Iran, the cyber sabotage of that country’s industries and infrastructure, the assassination of nuclear scientists, deployment of terrorist proxies such as the MEK, and the repeated threat of all-out war by the US and its Israeli surrogate, could all qualify Iran as already being subjected to war and not just a future target. Likewise with Russia: the expansion of US missile systems around Russia’s borders is an act of incremental war. Likewise China: the American arming of Taiwan, relentless war gaming in the South China Sea and the stoking of territorial conflicts are all examples of where «politics is but war by other means». What history shows us is that the modern world has been turned into a lawless shooting gallery under the unhinged misrule of the United States of America. That has always been so since at least the Second World War, with more than 60 wars having been waged by Washington during that period, and countless millions killed. For decades this truth has been obscured by propaganda – the Cold War, War on Terror etc – but now the appalling stark reality is unavoidably clear. The US is at war – against the entire world.

This politics is maintained by a farce of legitimacy which justifies endless destruction

Gulli 13 Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” <http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence>, pg. 5

I think that we have now an understanding of what the situation is: The sovereign everywhere, be it the political or financial elite, fakes the legitimacy on which its power and authority supposedly rest. In truth, they rest on violence and terror, or the threat thereof. This is an obvious and essential aspect of the singularity of the present crisis. In this sense, the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by the lack of hegemony. This is true in general, but it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, the United States, whose hegemony has diminished or vanished. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard. Lacking hegemony, the sheer drive for domination has to show its true face, its raw violence. The usual, traditional ideological justifications for dominance (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become very weak because of the contempt that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) regularly show toward legality, morality, and humanity. Of course, the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains a clear limit, a possibility. Not so for the dominant nations: who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in the Gaza Strip, or envious France from once again trying its luck in Africa? Yet, though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their structural, ontological and historical, weakness. All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) only heighten the brutality in the exertion of what remains of their dominance. Although they rely on a highly sophisticated military machine (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has traditionally been and increasingly is an outpost for military operations and global policing (now excellently incarnated by Africom), they know that they have lost their hegemony.

This manifests itself in a drive for certainty which causes endless violence

Burke, 7 (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

**Vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing the contradictions of imperial knowledge production – this dissident act fractures hegemonic thought**

**Spanos, 8** (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30)

On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective¶ of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its¶ poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance¶ either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he¶ influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation¶ of Western ontology are now painfully clear. We must,¶ rather, think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving¶ a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism¶ of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political¶ Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his¶ or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics¶ capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental¶ political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant,¶ the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities;¶ they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the¶ same world-historical event.¶ The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum¶ “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse¶ of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive¶ systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent¶ to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can¶ be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of¶ liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any¶ rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different,¶ “destabilizing” cultures, that this Left’s focus on historically specific¶ politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics¶ of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure¶ of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented¶ discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its¶ critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing¶ the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege¶ it over theory, the political over the ontological. Which is to say, it continues,¶ in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling—¶ disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory¶ logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical¶ logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project¶ proper.35 In so doing, this praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that¶ being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though¶ unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses¶ its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological¶ subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender,¶ and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or¶ global sphere). As a necessary result, it fails to perceive the emancipatory¶ political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized)¶ by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary¶ representation of being. By this relay of positively potential differences I do¶ not simply mean “the nothing” (das Nichts) or “the ontological difference”¶ (Heidegger), “existence” (Sartre), “the absolutely other” (Levinas), “the¶ differance” or “trace” (Derrida), “the differend” (Lyotard), the “invisible”¶ or “absent cause” (Althusser) that belong contradictorily to and haunt¶ “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking.36 I also mean “the pariah”¶ (Arendt), “the nomad” (Deleuze and Guattari), “the hybrid” or “the minus¶ in the origin” (Bhabha), “the nonbeings” (Dussel), the subaltern (Guha),¶ “the emigré” (Said), “the denizen” (Hammar), “the refugee” (Agamben),¶ “the queer” (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), “the multitude” (Negri and¶ Hardt),37 and, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international¶ post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern”¶ black American literature, “the darkness” (Morrison) that belong contradictorily¶ to and haunt “white”/imperial culture politics:¶ The images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to¶ explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency. Because¶ they appear almost always in conjunction with representations¶ of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or¶ under complete control, these images of blinding whiteness seem¶ to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is¶ the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence¶ that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear¶ and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature¶ seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex¶ and contradictory situation in which American writers found¶ themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature.38¶ In this chapter, I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of¶ the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think¶ the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to¶ know nothing” about,39 not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking¶ the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven¶ relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold¶ War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and¶ operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that¶ ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s¶ perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible¶ as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary¶ problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented¶ discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. In accordance¶ with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological¶ and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present¶ uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established¶ by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture,¶ I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming¶ the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of¶ the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the¶ post-Cold War conjuncture. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according¶ to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives¶ that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne¶ apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy¶ and the end of history. Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested,¶ will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity¶ constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a¶ continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical¶ Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary¶ (Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment¶ liberal humanist), has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also¶ show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would¶ obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring¶ to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post-¶ Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced¶ the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia (unconcealment) to veritas (the¶ adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized)¶ the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian¶ thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories¶ to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently¶ administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.

Every affirmation is a decision and an affirmation of a particular interpretation of what it means to decide – neutralizing that moment before a decision is in and of itself violent

**Dillon 99** (Michael Dillon, professor of international relations at the University of Lancaster, PhD in philosophy, April 1999, “Another Justice,” published in Political Theory Volume 27 Number 2, page 157-8)

I wish to argue, in addition, that the condition of being-in-between is exemplified by the 'inter' of another international relations. Especially in the proximity of the Refugee, for example, there is an explicit manifestation of the advent of the claim of Justice. The traditional intersubjectivity of international relations defaults, through the way in which the advent of the Refugee always calls to presence the stranger in the self itself, into the intra of a plural and divided self. The figure of the sovereign subject so integral to traditional international thought falsely poses the key questions of the self, of origination and of Justice. There can be no sovereign point of departure. The law is always born from a broken law, justice from the absence of Justice. There is always a co-presence of the other in the same; such that every self is a hybrid. The origin, if it is to issue forth in anything, therefore, must always already come divided and incomplete. The advent of Justice and the possibility of politics arise only because that plethos is ineradicable. There is then no sovereign subject. The self is a divided self from a beginning that is itself incomplete. It is only by virtue of that very division, that very incompleteness, that the question of justice arises at all. Thought of another Justice is therefore a continuous displacement of normal justice, a radical discomfort to it. But I have first to note how normal justice understands its place before considering the taking place of Justice differently. At its simplest the normal model of justice-sometimes known as the distributive model-notes that any society is governed by rules.9 Normal models differ, however, according to how they account for the derivation of those rules, what those rules define as just and unjust, and who or what is empowered by them to make, execute, and interpret the law. The most basic of these rules establish the status and entitlements of those who belong to the community. Correspondingly, these rules also specify who is a stranger, outsider, or alien, and they sometimes make provision for how the alien is to be dealt with should she or he appear at, or cross, the threshold of the community. This, in its crudest terms, is distributive justice. The laws, which it specifies, establish a regime of justice that expresses the ethical beliefs and commitments of that community. More than that, they inaugurate them. Each juridical decision is in some way, great or small, a communal rededication of those beliefs. The law, then, does not merely make a decision or enact a will. It reinaugurates a sense of what it is to have a will and make a decision in that community, as well as to what ends and purposes these may be devoted.10 Such law has to come from somewhere. An official narrative of one form or another supports how the community came to have the law which it does, together with the means and manner by which it is to be interpreted and exercised. That narrative explains both the origins of the law and the way in which it has been handed down. God and covenants, immemorial traditions and social contracts are amongst the most favoured of these. Divine inspiration, the dictates of reason, or a common sense are then said to furnish the law with the secure foundation it is thought to require. Injustice for the normal model, it further follows, is a function of sin, or the breakdown of reason, or the failure to attend to the dictates of common sense. One way or another, each of these ruptures tends to be blamed upon the irruption of irregular passions and desires which the law was inaugurated to limit and control as the means of determining and dispensing justice in the first place. Injustice for the normal model, in short, is the abnormal which effects a breach in the very paternity of the law itself. It is what the normal model claims to keep at bay as distributive justice orders the affairs of the community. All thought of justice and politics must, of course, pass through thought. How could it be otherwise? We think justice in the way that we do because of the various forms through which it is established and distributed. We also think justice in the way that we do because of the way that we think. The thought of another Justice is necessarily dependent therefore upon a way of thinking other than that which has historically come to govern our diverse onto-theological traditions of justice. That other way of thinking has continuously to be contrasted with the thought that underlies distributive justice, so that the characteristic features of another Justice may be differentiated from those of the normal model. Two of the key points of difference concern the interpretation of Time and the interpretation of the Human. Each of these derives from what I call the return of the ontological in continental thought.

### Transition

Lifting the embargo isn’t necessary

Jorge, 2000 (Dr. Antonio, Professor of Political Economy at Florida International University, "The U.S. Embargo and the Failure of the Cuban Economy" (2000).Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies Occasional Papers.Paper 28. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/iccaspapers/28)

Under the real world of Castroism, however, the answer must be a terse one: none. **The embargo has not harmed the Cuban economy**. Cooperation between the United States and Cuba would have been impossible from the very beginning of the Revolution for legal, political, ideological, strategic, and economic reasons, not to mention others of a philosophical or moral character. In other words, it was in the past, and continues to be at present, contrary to the United States’ national interest and to its fundamental foreign policy orientation and objectives to lift the embargo under Castro’s conditions: that is, without a firm commitment to the political democratization and market reforms that his regime has stubbornly opposed for the last 40 years. However, if, purely for the sake of an intellectual exercise, we were to assume that the embargo had never existed, its nonexistence would have had no effect whatsoever on the Cuban economy. Castro simply would have squandered U.S. instead of Soviet resources. Given Castro’s objectives and policies, the ultimate result for the Cuban economy could not have been any different, regardless of who had financed his Revolution

And, it’s not sufficient – current Cuban economic model prohibits FDI

Feinberg 11 - professor of international political economy at UC San Dieg, nonresident senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the International Response”, November, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118\_cuba\_feinberg.pdf)//ID

Despite these advances, the Cuban economy remains in the doldrums (as described in Section 1) . The main constraint slowing the Cuban economy is not U.S. sanctions (even as they have hit hard). Rather, it is Cuba’s own outdated economic model, inherited from the Soviet Union, of central planning. Cuba’s many commercial partners would like to invest more in Cuba and would prefer to purchase more Cuban exports to correct the imbalances in their bilateral trade accounts, but are frustrated by Cuba’s scant economic offerings.

No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

Their terrorism advantage is epistemologically suspect – legitimizes global violence

Raphael 9—IR, Kingston University (Sam, Critical terrorism studies, ed. Richard Jackson, 49-51) ellipses in orig.

Over the past thirty years, a small but politically-significant academic field of ‘terrorism studies’ has emerged from the relatively disparate research efforts of the 1960s and 1970s, and consolidated its position as a viable subset of ‘security studies’ (Reid, 1993: 22; Laqueur, 2003: 141). Despite continuing concerns that the concept of ‘terrorism’, as nothing more than a specific socio-political phenomenon, is not substantial enough to warrant an entire field of study (see Horgan and Boyle, 2008), it is nevertheless possible to identify a core set of scholars writing on the subject who together constitute an ‘epistemic community’ (Haas, 1992: 2–3). That is, there exists a ‘network of knowledge-based experts’ who have ‘recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain’. This community, or ‘network of productive authors’, has operated by establishing research agendas, recruiting new members, securing funding opportunities, sponsoring conferences, maintaining informal contacts, and linking separate research groups (Reid, 1993, 1997). Regardless of the largely academic debate over whether the study of terrorism should constitute an independent field, the existence of a clearly-identifiable research community (with particular individuals at its core) is a social fact.2¶ Further, this community has traditionally had significant influence when it comes to the formulation of government policy, particularly in the United States. It is not the case that the academic field of terrorism studies operates solely in the ivory towers of higher education; as noted in previous studies (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 180; Burnett and Whyte, 2005), it is a community which has intricate and multifaceted links with the structures and agents of state power, most obviously in Washington. Thus, many recognised terrorism experts have either had prior employment with, or major research contracts from, the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and other key US Government agencies (Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989: 142–190; RAND, 2004). Likewise, a high proportion of ‘core experts’ in the field (see below) have been called over the past thirty years to testify in front of Congress on the subject of terrorism (Raphael, forthcoming). Either way, these scholars have fed their ‘knowledge’ straight into the policymaking process in the US.3¶ The close relationship between the academic field of terrorism studies and the US state means that it is critically important to analyse the research output from key experts within the community. This is particularly the case because of the aura of objectivity surrounding the terrorism ‘knowledge’ generated by academic experts. Running throughout the core literature is a positivist assumption, explicitly stated or otherwise, that the research conducted is apolitical and objective (see for example, Hoffman, 1992: 27; Wilkinson, 2003). There is little to no reflexivity on behalf of the scholars, who see themselves as wholly dissociated from the politics surrounding the subject of terrorism. This reification of academic knowledge about terrorism is reinforced by those in positions of power in the US who tend to distinguish the experts from other kinds of overtly political actors. For example, academics are introduced to Congressional hearings in a manner which privileges their nonpartisan input:¶ Good morning. The Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism meets in open session to receive testimony and discuss the present and future course of terrorism in the Middle East. . . . It has been the Terrorism Panel’s practice, in the interests of objectivity and gathering all the facts, to pair classified briefings and open briefings. . . . This way we garner the best that the classified world of intelligence has to offer and the best from independent scholars working in universities, think tanks, and other institutions . . .¶ (Saxton, 2000, emphasis added)¶ The representation of terrorism expertise as ‘independent’ and as providing ‘objectivity’ and ‘facts’ has significance for its contribution to the policymaking process in the US. This is particularly the case given that, as we will see, core experts tend to insulate the broad direction of US policy from critique. Indeed, as Alexander George noted, it is precisely because ‘they are trained to clothe their work in the trappings of objectivity, independence and scholarship’ that expert research is ‘particularly effective in securing influence and respect for’ the claims made by US policymakers (George, 1991b: 77).¶ Given this, it becomes vital to subject the content of terrorism studies to close scrutiny. Based upon a wider, systematic study of the research output of key figures within the field (Raphael, forthcoming), and building upon previous critiques of terrorism expertise (see Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Herman, 1982; Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989; Chomsky, 1991; George, 1991b; Jackson, 2007g), this chapter aims to provide a critical analysis of some of the major claims made by these experts and to reveal the ideological functions served by much of the research. Rather than doing so across the board, this chapter focuses on research on the subject of terrorism from the global South which is seen to challenge US interests. Examining this aspect of research is important, given that the ‘threat’ from this form of terrorism has led the US and its allies to intervene throughout the South on behalf of their national security, with profound consequences for the human security of people in the region.¶ Specifically, this chapter examines two major problematic features which characterise much of the field’s research. First, in the context of anti-US terrorism in the South, many important claims made by key terrorism experts simply replicate official US government analyses. This replication is facilitated primarily through a sustained and uncritical reliance on selective US government sources, combined with the frequent use of unsubstantiated assertion. This is significant, not least because official analyses have often been revealed as presenting a politically-motivated account of the subject. Second, and partially as a result of this mirroring of government claims, the field tends to insulate from critique those ‘counterterrorism’ policies justified as a response to the terrorist threat. In particular, the experts overwhelmingly ‘silence’ the way terrorism is itself often used as a central strategy within US-led counterterrorist interventions in the South. That is, ‘counterterrorism’ campaigns executed or supported by Washington often deploy terrorism as a mode of controlling violence (Crelinsten, 2002: 83; Stohl, 2006: 18–19).¶ These two features of the literature are hugely significant. Overall, the core figures in terrorism studies have, wittingly or otherwise, produced a body of work plagued by substantive problems which together shatter the illusion of ‘objectivity’. Moreover, the research output can be seen to serve a very particular ideological function for US foreign policy. Across the past thirty years, it has largely served the interests of US state power, primarily through legitimising an extensive set of coercive interventions in the global South undertaken under the rubric of various ‘war(s) on terror’. After setting out the method by which key experts within the field have been identified, this chapter will outline the two main problematic features which characterise much of the research output by these scholars. It will then discuss the function that this research serves for the US state.

**No Mid East escalation**

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(Christopher, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” *Survival*, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, December, p. 83 – 98)

Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni-Shia violence from sweeping into every country where the religious divide exists. A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intra-Muslim civil war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their own, and a nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, however, none of these outcomes is particularly likely.Wider war No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region's autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam's rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq's neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their co-religionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor - the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare.

North Korean apocalyptic threat discourse utilizes Manichean dichotomies to serve the American hegemonic project – the aff’s representations are militaristic attempts to stifle political dissent and exert coercive control over the orient – a strategy like the affirmative’s can only lead to napalm and radioactive ash

Cunningham 13 (Finian Cunningham, expert in international affairs specializing in the Middle East, former journalist expelled from Bahrain due to his revealing of human rights violations committed by the Western-backed regime, basically a badass, 4-1-13, “US Protection Racket Root of Korea Conflict,” http://nsnbc.me/2013/04/01/us-protection-racket-root-of-korea-conflict/) gz

The conflict emanates from Washington and is perpetuated by Washington. Why? To justify what would otherwise be seen as simply outrageous US militarism in the Asia Pacific hemisphere, and in particular a criminally aggressive agenda towards the main geopolitical targets of Washington – China and Russia. Korea’s conflict is not primarily about North and South “enemy states”. It is, as it has been for the past 68 years since the end of World War II, about Washington using military force to criminally assert its hegemony on the global stage. But you wouldn’t know this from a casual reading of the Western news media. No, we are told over and over again that the US is “protecting” South Korea and its other Asian allies. The military presence of the US is “serving” as a “deterrent” to aggression from a “sinister” North Korea. In this depiction, the US is the good guy, while North Korea is the menacing reprobate that is a scourge on everybody’s well-being and security. Kim Jong-un is the embodiment of the Axis of Evil. That so-called “quality” news media such as the BBC, New York Times and Guardian can get away with seriously presenting this situation in terms portraying the US as a benevolent force is an astounding feat of reality inversion and brainwashed mind control. The irony is that such media implicitly mock North Korea as a Stalinist “Big Brother” state, where critical thought and expression are forbidden. Yet, these media display the very same habit of mental conformity that they disparage North Korea for. As noted above, the only way of properly interpreting the recent weeks of threat and counter-threat of all-out war in Korea is to recall scenes from the classic Mafia movie, The Godfather. You know the drill. The mobster goes around the neighborhood demanding loyalty, respect and tributes “for protection”. If the residents don’t conform to the racket, then the boss arranges self-fulfilling violence to rain down on those who dare to reject his magnanimous “protection”. The exact same arrangement applies in Korea under the tutelage of the US. The Peninsula was unilaterally partitioned in 1945 by Washington into North and South statelets because the US could not abide the fact that the Korean population at that time was strongly anti-imperialist and yearning for socialist democracy. That egalitarian sentiment helped the Koreans resist the occupying Japanese imperialists prior to and during World War II. Tellingly, in order to assert its hegemony over Korea and the Asia Pacific, the US worked the neighborhood over assiduously in order to defeat the popular movement for independence and democracy that the Korean people exhibited so boldly. Washington achieved this by installing pro-Japanese collaborators as the rulers of newly formed South Korea. Think about that one. The US fought a war allegedly to defeat fascism and imperialism, only to immediately collude with the same political forces to defeat Korean democracy. The dropping of the atomic bombs by Washington on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was part and parcel of American efforts to demarcate a postwar hegemony in the Asia Pacific to the Soviet Union and China – and this is why Korea was also fractured into two alien states that were then precipitated into war between 1950-53. That war – in which a third of the northern Korean population were exterminated by American indiscriminate carpet-bombing and napalm incineration – has never officially ended. The armistice signed in 1953 under Washington’s dictate is technically only a ceasefire. For decades, North Korea’s demand for a full peace treaty has been repeatedly rejected by Washington and its South Korean client state. In other words, Washington has retained the implicit prerogative to resume its aerial bombardment of the North Korean population at any time it chooses. That constitutes a constant threat, or a policy of state terrorism by Washington. The threat from the US towards the Korean population has and continues to include nuclear annihilation. During the Korean War, the US air force would regularly fly nuclear-capable B-52 bombers over the Peninsula. People on the ground would recognize the aircraft, but they did not know what the operational intent was. Can you imagine the terrorism that this conveyed? – barely five years after the US vaporized the civilian populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and at the same time that US military were compelling Koreans to live in caves as the only way of escaping mass destruction from conventional bombing. This same thuggish behaviour by the US government is consistent with its authorization during this past week for the flying of nuclear-capable B-2 and B-52 bombers over the Korean Peninsula. The dropping of “inert bombs” by these aerial monsters has to be seen as a heinous calculation in Washington aimed at heightening the terrorism. Yet, absurdly, the Western propaganda organs, otherwise called news, portray this American state terrorism as “protection”. The New York Times, for example, quoted one so-called “expert” as explaining North Korea’s response to the latest American provocation by saying: “The North Korean populace has to be regularly reminded that their country is surrounded by scheming enemies. Otherwise, they might start asking politically dangerous questions.” The laugh about this brain-washed expert thinking, and the New York Times promoting it, is that the people of Korea are indeed surrounded by a scheming enemy – the US – and if the wider international public and media were to start thinking about that fact then there would be “politically dangerous questions” such as: what gives the US the right to conduct annual military “war games” off and on the Korean Peninsula for the past six decades, including the deployment of nuclear annihilation? The people of Korea, North and South, deserve and desire peace. Despite the antagonism and belligerence highlighted in the Western propaganda media, the majority of people of North and South Korea have in fact no wish for war. The consensus among ordinary Koreans is for peace and a democratic resolution to decades of conflict imposed on their homeland from outside. But they won’t obtain that reasonable condition as long as Washington continues to run its “protection racket”. And, unfortunately, the American government will not, cannot stop its criminal behaviour – because domination, aggression and terrorism are the hallmarks of Washington’s Mafia regime.

The affirmative’s discourse of Iran is not only patently false but plays into a larger structure of militarism dominating the modern public sphere – this economy of gratuitous violence actualizes their apocalyptic rhetoric and perpetuates endless genocide

Cunningham 13 (Finian Cunningham, expert in international affairs specializing in the Middle East, former journalist expelled from Bahrain due to his revealing of human rights violations committed by the Western-backed regime, basically a badass, 4-23-13, “Hagel on Middle East Tour; US Steps Up Regime Change Bid on Iran,” <http://nsnbc.me/2013/04/23/hagel%C2%B4s-middle-east-tour-us-steps-up-regime-change-bid-on-iran/>) gz

Hagel’s cozying up to Israeli partners-in-crime nails the lie that the Obama White House is somehow at odds with Tel Aviv over Middle East policy and Iran in particular. Nothing could be further from the truth. Washington is as wired for war as ever, and this belligerent impetus comes from Washington, not the rogue entity in Tel Aviv. In what can only be described as a grotesque display of lawlessness and incendiary rhetoric, Hagel declared Iran a “real threat” and said that the US would stand by the Israeli state if the latter chose to launch a preemptive military strike on the Islamic Republic. “The bottom line is that Iran is a threat, a real threat,” Hagel told reporters while onboard his weekend flight to the Middle East. Hagel flew into Tel Aviv bearing gifts worth $10 billion in the latest American military hardware, including upgraded precision-guided missiles, stealth radar equipment, V22 Osprey transport warplanes and the giant 135-KC refueling aerial tankers. The arms deal “sends a clear message to Iran” that the military option is on the table, warned Hagel. The items in the weapons inventory convey a thinly veiled threat of attack on Iran. The Israeli state, which has a wanton criminal track record for unilateral air strikes against neighbouring countries over many decades, will now be in a stronger position to conduct bombing raids on geographically more remote Iran, as a result of the latest longer-range capabilities bestowed by its US patron. And it’s not just the Tel Aviv regime that the US is arming to the teeth. The Sunni dictatorships of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – sworn enemies of Shia Iran in their proxy war-making in Syria and Iraq – are also to enjoy the latest military munificence from Washington. Reports say that the $10bn arms supply is to include air-to-ground missiles for Saudi Arabia and F-16 fighter jets for the UAE. What this amounts to is an escalation of all-out war threat towards Iran from Washington and its regional client regimes. This display of unprovoked militarism by the US towards Iran constitutes an act of aggression, which is in itself a war crime. Iran’s government should consider filing a lawsuit. The crime is all the more damning because it has no rational or material foundation. It is a gratuitous threat of violence against a sovereign, peaceful country based on paranoid misinformation and downright calumny. Of course, nothing should surprise us about US or Israeli criminality and state terrorism given the recent genocides in Afghanistan and Iraq, and crimes against humanity in Lebanon and Libya and ongoing in Palestine, Syria, Pakistan and Somalia, among other places. While pathetically fawning over his Israeli hosts, Hagel reiterated the hackneyed lies about Iran’s nuclear program. “The Iranians must be prevented from developing that capacity to build a nuclear weapon and deliver it,” said Hagel. This is disgraceful, asinine deception hardly worth repeating. But for the record, the US secretary of offence went on to say: “Iran presents a threat in its nuclear program and Israel will make its decisions that Israel must make to protect itself and defend itself.” What is disturbing about this trope is that one of America’s senior military chiefs – who takes decisions on whether to go to war or not – is either telling barefaced lies or is woefully ignorant of hiscountry’s own intelligence estimates. Only last week in Washington, the US Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, told a Senate Committee that Iran does not have a nuclear weapon. This is a well-established assessment of Iran’s nuclear program, which has been made previously by over a dozen US intelligence organizations, going back several years. Clapper also told the Senate Intelligence Committee that he did not know whether Iran’s leadership would in the future decide to build a nuclear weapon, but the fact is that the country did not have a nuclear weapons program now, nor was Iran pursuing an aggressive regional policy. To that assessment, we can add the clear, unambiguous statements by Iranian leaders that the country has no intention to pursue the construction of nuclear arms out of deeply held ethical reasons and also out of many practical considerations. Only last week Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad while on an official visit to Africa denounced the age of nuclear weapons as a relic of the past. However, he added that Iran has every right to develop nuclear energy, as for all nations. So, if US militarism towards Iran is not justified or credible based on the false claims of nuclear threat, what is it really about? It harks back to the old chestnut, regime change. Many people know this already perhaps, but what seems necessary is to expose this agenda, and the American criminality behind it, beyond any doubt to the wider world and the Western public in particular. Recent remarks from John Kerry, the US secretary of state, about tightening (illegal) economic sanctions on Iran and the possible influence the US intends that this will have on the outcome of the Iranian presidential elections in June has to be seen in the context of a multi-pronged offensive tactic. The American-backed proxy genocidal war on Iran’s main regional ally Syria is also part of this game plan. The latest stepped-up threats of criminal war on Iran – under the spurious pretext of nuclear weapons and “Israeli security” – are evidently part of the wider effort by Washington to pile pressure on the Iranian people and their government. Criminal, heinous, and most likely futile, but nevertheless Washington feels that it can force Iran to buckle under the weight of political, economic and military war.

### Multilat

1AC lake evidence concludes the plan fails and that public backlash takes out solvency

Lake, their author 10 (Professor of Social Sciences, distinguished professor of political science at UC San Diego, David A., “Making America Safe for the World: Multilateralism and the Rehabilitation of US authority”, http://dss.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeMakingAmericaSafe.pdf)//NG

At the same time, if any organization is to be an effective restraint on the United States, **other countries** will have to make **serious and integral contributions** to the collective effort. **Both sides** to this new multilateral bargain will need to recognize and appreciate the benefits of a stable international order to their own security and prosperity and contribute to its success - 480 Making America Safe for the World. The United States will need to continue to play a disproportionate role in providing international order, even as it accepts new restraints on its freedom of action. **Other countries**, however, must also contribute to the provision of this political order so that they can provide a meaningful check on US authority. ¶ **Americans are likely to resist** the idea of tying their hands more tightly in a new multilateral compact.

More 1AC ev says there’s a litany of alt causes

Burgsdorff, their author 9(Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of Miami (Sven Kühn von, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”, http://aei.pitt.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/11047/1/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf)//NG

As a matter of fact, **together with** other measures such as closing **Guantanamo**, signing up to the **Kyoto Protocol** and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the **Bali conference**, and possibly, joining the **International Criminal Court** as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the **1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child**, it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.

Their conception of the power triangle between India, US, and China is steeped in ahistorical, hypermasculine and inaccurate models of power that push out more accurate and peaceful understandings of the relationships between peoples of the countries they describe—reject their discourse

Banerjee and Ling, 6

Payal, (PhD, Syracuse University, Sociology) is an Assistant Professor in Sociology @ Syracuse AND L. H. M., Associate Professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs (GPIA) at The New School in New York City “Hypermasculine War Games: Triangulating US-India-China” <http://www.gpia.info/files/u1/wp/2006-12.pdf>

This paper examines the current US security discourse on “triangulating” relations with India and China. Drawn from its Cold War precedent involving the US, the Soviet Union, and China, this strategy casts the US in a position of “playing” the “China card” against India, or the “India card” against China, as a means of obtaining crucial concessions from each. Contrary to most treatments of the subject, however, this paper does not decipher the specifics of US-India-China geopolitics: its goals, strategies, outcomes. Nor does it seek to survey this relationship from the perspective of each state. Such analyses have been undertaken – indeed, they comprise the majority of the literature on the subject – yet they produce little new insight that is productive for considering future relations between the US, India, and China. They tend, instead, to rehash the same old concepts and dynamics, **freezing this relationship and our understanding of it in a realist time warp as if the Cold War never ended, India and China have not really globalized, and national elites think the same wherever and whoever they are.** 2We offer another approach to US-India-China relations. We examine the social relations behind “triangulating” these three states, particularly from the perspective of US defense intellectuals.3 We do so to evaluate the merits of participating in such a discourse in the first place. In this sense, **discourse is practice** (cf. Weldes 1999; Milliken1999). We ask: Which identities and roles are assigned by whom to whom in this security discourse, and how are its benefits and penalties distributed systematically? Put differently, why would those who benefit least and suffer most from this discourse put up with it? Even for those who seem to benefit most from this discourse, what are its costs and consequences? And what alternatives could we consider instead? Here, we focus on the **security discourse that emanates from the US. As the world’s sole superpower, its constructions of world politics invariably precipitate(re)actions from others**. Of course, India and China have their own security discourses is-à-vis the US as well as each other and we will touch upon them here. Indeed, a similar, relational analysis should be conducted for each – but in due time. In this paper, we begin with the US. John Garver’s article, “The China-India-US Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post-Cold War Era” (NBR Analysis 2002) aptly illustrates “triangulation” as a national security strategy. Not only does Garver present the strategy as eminently objective, rational, and historically accurate, but also the article’s site of publication, NBR Analysis, comes from a well-respected, well-established source of research and intelligence on Asia. The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) self-identifies as “nonprofit, nonpartisan” and “devoted to bridging the policy, academic, and business communities with advanced policy-relevant research on Asia” (http://www.nbr.org). A closer examination of NBR’s Board of Directors reveals a very partisan membership composed of mega-corporations (e.g., Unocal, Coca Cola, Corning, Microsoft, Boeing, Ford) and their **elite associates in the military** (e.g., former US joint chiefs of staff chairman General John M. Shalikashvili), industry (e.g., Virginia Mason Medical Center), and academia(e.g., American Enterprise Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center). Furthermore, NBR makes its reports and publications easily available on-line to ensure a wide readership. Our singular focus on Garver’s article, then, is more than compensated by its representativeness, not just in terms of its views but also the interests and social infrastructure behind them. We argue that the **US security discourse of “triangulation” perpetuates hypermasculine war games.** By hyper masculinity, we draw on Ashis Nandy’s (1988)identification of an exaggeration or distortion of those traits traditionally-assigned as masculine, like aggression and competition, at the expense of so-called feminine ones, like intellection and concern for social welfare, **to justify colonial power relations**. Hypermasculinity affects colonizer and colonized alike such that each becomes a co-victim of colonialism and imperialism. For both, hypermasculinity leads to an “undeveloped heart” that sanctions sexism, racism, false cultural homogeneity, and most insidiously, banal violence. In the case of US-India-China triangulation, this discourse allows former colonizers to retain their role as globe-spanning arbiters of the “rules of the game.” The formerly colonized, meanwhile, are relegated to a condition of postcolonial mimicry externally regardless of their elevated status internally. They must demonstrate forever their “manhood” or other forms of “legitimacy” according to the white man’s terms. Given this context of colonialized, radicalized nationalism for ruling elites, hypermasculine war games set up a globalized hierarchy of gender, class, and culture for the rest of us. The proliferation of “desire industries” (Agathangelou and Ling 2003) all over the world, despite governmental condemnation and policing, offers one such indication. Whether women or femininity or even feminist analysis should intervene in this exclusive (neo)colonial club is beside the point. **We, all of us, need to not just change “the rules” but displace “the game” altogether.** One way is to recognize the social relations that already exist in contrast to those imputed by conventional security. The latter fixates narrowly on questions of states-and-borders, law-and-order, who’s-on-top competitiveness whereas a broader appreciation of the binding engagements and contestations that make up everyday life asks: How do we want to live? For India and China, we can draw from a millennia-old archive of encounters, exchanges, and flows. We conclude with implications of this history for security in contemporary world politics.

## 2NC

### framework

situated position underpins political efficacy

Dillon 99 (Michael Dillon, professor of politics at the University of Lancaster, 1999, “Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics,” pp 97-8)

Heirs to all this, we find ourselves in the turbulent and now globalized wake of its confluence. As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political4-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about anything that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other regional modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.

Moreover, representations and the affective field of images are the basis and motivation for war. What we lack is not a proper scientific or empirical challenge to violence; we lack the cultural critics willing to fight the fear mongering which results in war. The AFF’s discourse is enmeshed in a form of affective securitization that makes war inevitable. As scholars, we have an obligation to refuse and problematize the cultural grammar of security.

Elliott 2012

/Emory, University Professor of the University of California and Distinguished Professor of English at the University of California, Riverside Terror, Theory, and the Humanities ed. Di Leo, Open Humanities Press, Online/

In a 1991 interview for the New York Times Magazine, Don DeLillo expressed his views on the place of literature in our times in a statement that he has echoed many times since and developed most fully in his novel Mao II: In a repressive society, a writer can be deeply influential, but in a society that’s ﬁlled with glut and endless consumption, the act of terror may be the only meaningful act. People who are in power make their arrangements in secret, largely as a way of maintaining and furthering that power. People who are powerless make an open theater of violence. True terror is a language and a vision. There is a deep narrative structure to terrorist acts, and they infiltrate and alter consciousness in ways that writers used to aspire to. (qtd. in DePietro 84) The implications of DeLillo’s statement are that we are all engaged in national, international, transnational, and global conflicts in which acts of representation, including those of terrorism and spectacular physical violence as well as those of language, performance, and art compete for the attention of audiences and for influence in the public sphere. In the early days of the Iraq War, the United States used the power of images, such as those of the “mother of all bombs” and a wide array of weapons, as well as aesthetic techniques to influence and shape the consciousness of millions and to generate strong support for the war. The shock, fear, and nationalism aroused in those days after 9/11 have enabled the Bush administration to pursue a military agenda that it had planned before 9/11. Since then, the extraordinary death and destruction, scandals and illegalities, and domestic and international demonstrations and criticisms have been unable to alter the direction of this agenda. Those of us in the humanities who are trained as critical readers of political and social texts, as well as of complex artistically constructed texts, are needed now more urgently than ever to analyze the relationships between political power and the wide range of rhetorical methods being employed by politicians and others to further their destructive effects in the world. If humanities scholars can create conscious awareness of how such aesthetic devices such as we see in those photos achieve their affective appeal, citizens may begin to understand how they are being manipulated and motivated by emotion rather than by reason and logic. In spite of our ability to expose some of these verbal and visual constructions as devices of propaganda that function to enflame passions and stifle reasonable discussion, we humanities scholars find ourselves marginalized and on the defensive in our institutions of higher learning where our numbers have been diminished and where we are frequently being asked to justify the significance of our research and teaching. While we know the basic truth that the most serious threats to our societies today are more likely to result from cultural differences and failures of communication than from inadequate scientific information or technological inadequacies, we have been given no voice in this debate. With the strong tendency toward polarized thinking and opinion and the evangelical and fundamentalist religious positions in the US today and in other parts of the world, leaders continue to abandon diplomacy and resort to military actions. Most government leaders find the cultural and social explanations of the problems we face to be vague, and they are frustrated by complex human issues. That is not reason enough, however, for us to abandon our efforts to influence and perhaps even alter the current course of events. In spite of the discouragements that we as scholars of the humanities are experiencing in these times, it seems to me that we have no option but to continue to pursue our research and our teaching and hope to influence others to question the meaning and motives of what they see and hear.

4) ceding imagination to the state effaces agency and unlocks atrocity – choose to confront your role in violence

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs 9-11)

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war,' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere . It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia \_ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

### H-triv

Rejecting Holocaust rhetoric depoliticizes it which causes mass violence

Zizek 2001

[Slavoj, Go away, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?, 2001, New York: Verso, 2001, 67-8]

Are these not the terms that designate the Lacanian encounter of the Real? However, this very depoliticization of the Holocaust, its elevation into the properly sublime Evil, the un'touchable Exception beyond the reach of 'normal' political discourse, can also be a political act of utter cynical manipulation, a political intervention aiming at legitimizing a certain kind of hierarchical political relation. First, it is part of the postmodern strategy of depoliticization and/or victimization. Second, it disqualifies forms of Third World violence for which Western states are (co)responsible as minor in comparison with the Absolute Evil of the Holocaust. Third, it serves to cast a shadow over every rad ical political project - to reinforce the Denkverbot against a radical political imagination: 'Are you aware that what you propose leads ultimately to the Holocaust?' In short: notwithstanding the unquestionable sincerity of some of its proponents, the 'objective' ideologico-political content of the depoliticization of the Holocaust, of its ele vation into the abyssal absolute Evil, is the political pact of aggressive Zionists and Western Rightist anti-Semites at the expense oftoday's radical political possibilities. In it, Israeli expansionism towards Palestinians para doxically joins hands with the Western anti-Semite's avoidance of the concrete analysis of the political dynamics of anti-Semitism of how this same dynamics is today pursued by other means (or, rather, with other goals, displaced on to other targets).

### Heg

**even if they win hegemony is real, the universalization of hegemonic ontology makes violence through backlash the only possible response – they’re in a double bind**

**Mouffe 7** Chantal Mouffe, Professor of Political Theory at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, 2007, “Carl Schmitt’s warning on the dangers of a unipolar world,” in The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt, Edited by: Odysseos and Petito, p. 152

I submit that it is high time to acknowledge the pluralist character of the world and to relinquish the Eurocentric tenet that modernization can only take place through Westernization. We should relinquish the illusion that antagonisms could be eliminated through unification of the world, achieved by transcending the political, conflict and negativity. It is also necessary to abandon the idea that the aim of politics is to establish consensus on one single model. The central problem that our current unipolar world is facing is that it is impossible for antagonisms to find legitimate forms of expression. It is no wonder, then, that those antagonisms, when they emerge, take extreme forms, putting into question the very structure of the existing international order. It is, in my view, the lack of political channels for challenging the hegemony of the neo-liberal model of globalization which is at the origin of the proliferation of discourses and practices of radical negation of the established order. In order to create channels for the legitimate expression of dissent we need to envisage a pluralistic world order constructed around a certain number of great spaces and genuine cultural poles.¶ The new forms of terrorism reveal the dangers implicit in the delusions of the universalist globalist discourse which postulates that human progress requires the establishment of world unity based on the adoption of the Western model. This is why, against the illusions of the universalist-humanitarians, it is urgent to listen to Schmitt when he reminds us that ‘[t]he political world is a pluriverse, not a universe’ (Schmitt 1976: 53). This is, I believe, the only way to avoid the ‘clash of civilizations’ announced by Huntington (1996) and to which, despite its intentions, the universalist discourse is, in fact, contributing.

### Cuba

Slater 97 (David, Ph.D from London School of Economics and Professor Emeritus of Geography at Loughborough University, “Geopolitical imaginations across the North-South divide: issues of difference, development and power,” Political Geography Vol. 16 Issue 8, November 1997, pp. 631-653, Muse, slim\_)

By the beginning of the twentieth century, notions of manifest destiny and civilizing missions, taken together with the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, had become a prominent feature in the formulation of foreign policy. Motivated by a sense of mission, which was linked to territorial and economic gain (LaFeber, 1963), the United States assumed its share of the ‘White Man’s Burden’,‘l and in the years from 1898 to 1915 it acquired an empire that embraced territories in the Pacific Ocean and the nearer Caribbean sea. The latter region, taken together with Central America, came to be regarded as America‘s ‘backyard’.22 The use of such a term is in itself revealing since the backyard is a vital part of the American family’s geography. It is a place that **evinces deep feelings about control and ownership-assumed** and yet vital to the family’s security. The backyard is a space that is walled off against intruders; it is a zone for play, experimentation and control, a place that acts as a laboratory for ideas that can be tried out beyond its walls.23 Perhaps no place in this imaginary space assumed as much significance as the island of Cuba. Towards the end of the last century, as Cuba was brought closer into the orbit of United States power, it was asserted that ‘it is manifest destiny that the commerce and the progress of the island shall follow American channels and adopt American forms’ (Benjamin, 1990: 54). A guiding motivation of political and economic tutelage was clearly reflected in the nature of US intervention and occupation of Cuba at the turn of the century. As a result of US armed intervention and subsequent military occupation Cuba ceded territory for the establishment of a foreign naval base (Guantanamo),24 agreed to a significant curtailment of its national sovereignty and authorized future US interventions The Permanent Treaty of 1903, known as the Platt Amendment, included an article which stipulated the right of the United States to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence.l’ Power over Cuba was also expressed through the dissolution of the institutions of the Cuban independence movement-the Liberation Army, the Provisional Government and the Cuban Revolutionary Party, originally founded by Jose Marti. United States tutelage over Cuba also included the transfer of over 1000 Cuban teachers to Harvard for training in US teaching methods, and Protestant evangelists established almost 90 schools in Catholic Cuba between 1898 and 1901. In addition, teams of US experts placed the mineral, agricultural and human resources of the island under their scientific gaze. The significance of **tutelage was reflected through the visual representation of Cuba inside the United States**. At the end of the war with Spain, the independence struggle of the Cubans was characterized by a portrayal of Cuba as a Latin maiden, vulnerable and in need of protection (see Fig. I). However, after the war of Independence was won, there was a re- direction of Cuban nationalist aspirations against US influence, and as a consequence **the portrayal of Cuba inside the United States tended to shift** from that of a vulnerable Latin female to a thankless and unruly Black brat, in need of discipline and guidance (see Fig. L?).‘” The Father-child distancing was intensified by the racial distinction of the Father being white and the child black.27

## 1NR

### Perm

Perm fails

**Burke 7** (Anthony, lecturer at Adelaide University School of History and Politics, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4)

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.

### Disease

**No extinction**

Malcolm **Gladwell**, writer for The New Yorker and best-selling author The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 19**95**, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 31-32

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.

Apoc disease rhetoric = violence

Gomel 2000(Elana Gomel, English department head at Tel Aviv University, Winter 2000, published in Twentieth Century Literature Volume 46, <http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0403/is_4_46/ai_75141042>)

In the secular apocalyptic visions that have proliferated wildly in the last 200 years, the world has been destroyed by nuclear wars, alien invasions, climatic changes, social upheavals, meteor strikes, and technological shutdowns. These baroque scenarios are shaped by the eroticism of disaster. The apocalyptic desire that finds satisfaction in elaborating fictions of the End is double-edged. On the one hand, its ultimate object is some version of the crystalline New Jerusalem, an image of purity so absolute that it denies the organic messiness of life. [1] On the other hand, apocalyptic fictions typically linger on pain and suffering. The end result of apocalyptic purification often seems of less importance than the narrative pleasure derived from the bizarre and opulent tribulations of the bodies being burnt by fire and brimstone, tormented by scorpion stings, trodden like grapes in the winepress. In this interplay between the incorporeal purity of the ends and the violent corporeality of the means the apocalyptic body is born. It is a body whose mortal sickness is a precondition of ultimate health, whose grotesque and excessive sexuality issues in angelic sexlessness, and whose torture underpins a painless--and lifeless--millennium.The apocalyptic body is perverse, points out Tina Pippin, unstable and mutating from maleness to femaleness and back again, purified by the sadomasochistic "bloodletting on the cross," trembling in abject terror while awaiting an unearthly consummation (122). But most of all it is a suffering body, a text written in the script of stigmata, scars, wounds, and sores. Any apocalypse strikes the body politic like a disease, progressing from the first symptoms of a large-scale disaster through the crisis of the tribulation to the recovery of the millennium. But of all the Four Horsemen, the one whose ride begins most intimately, in the private travails of individual flesh, and ends in the devastation of the entire community, is the last one, Pestilence. The contagious body is the most characteristic modality of apocalyptic corporeality. At the same time, I will argue, it contains a counterapocalyptic potential, resisting the dangerous lure of Endism, the ideologically potent combination of "apocalyptic terror", a nd "millennial perfection" (Quinby 2). This essay, a brief sketch of the poetics and politics of the contagious body, does not attempt a comprehensive overview of the historical development of the trope of pestilence. Nor does it limit itself to a particular disease, along the lines of Susan Sontag's classic delineation of the poetics of TB and many subsequent attempts to develop a poetics of AIDS. Rather, my focus is on the general narrativity of contagion and on the way the plague-stricken body is manipulated within the overall plot of apocalyptic millennialism, which is a powerful ideological current in twentieth-century political history, embracing such diverse manifestations as religious fundamentalism, Nazism, and other forms of "radical desperation" (Quinby 4--5). Thus, I consider both real and imaginary diseases, focusing on the narrative construction of the contagious body rather than on the precise epidemiology of the contagion. All apocalyptic and millenarian ideologies ultimately converge on the utopian transformation of the body (and the body politic) through suffering. But pestilence offers a uniquely ambivalent modality of corporeal apocalypse. On the one hand, it may be appropriated to the standard plot of apocalyptic purification as a singularly atrocious technique of separating the damned from the saved. Thus, the plague becomes a metaphor for genocide, functioning as such both in Mein Kampf and in Camus's The Plague.[2] On the other hand, the experience of a pandemic undermines the giddy hopefulness of Endism. Since everybody is a potential victim, the line between the pure and the impure can never be drawn with any precision. Instead of delivering the climactic moment of the Last Judgment, pestilence lingers on, generating a limbo of common suffering in which a tenuous and moribund but all-embracing body politic springs into being. The end is indefinitely postponed and the disease becomes a metaphor for the process of livi ng. The finality of mortality clashes with the duration of morbidity. Pestilence is poised on the cusp between divine punishment and manmade disaster. On the one hand, unlike nuclear war or ecological catastrophe, pandemic has a venerable historical pedigree that leads back from current bestsellers such as Pierre Quellette's The Third Pandemic (1996) to the medieval horrors of the Black Death and indeed to the Book of Revelation itself. On the other hand, disease is one of the central tropes of biopolitics, shaping much of the twentieth-century discourse of power, domination, and the body. Contemporary plague narratives, including the burgeoning discourse of AIDS, are caught between two contrary textual impulses: acquiescence in a (super) natural judgment and political activism. Their impossible combination produces a clash of two distinct plot modalities. In his contemporary incarnations the Fourth Horseman vacillates between the voluptuous entropy of indiscriminate killing and the genocidal energy directed at specific categories of victims. As Richard Dellamora points out in his gloss on Derrida, apocalypse in general may be used "in order to validate violence done to others" while it may also function as a modality of total resistance to the existing order (3). But my concern here is not so much with the difference between "good" and "bad" apocalypses (is total extinction "better" than selective genocide?) as with the interplay of eschatology and politics in the construction of the apocalyptic body.

### Util

Util bad

Weizman 11 (Eyal Weizman, professor of visual and spatial cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, 2011, “The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza,” pp 8-10)

The theological origins of the lesser evil argument cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book *The Lesser Evil*, Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, ‘do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort.’12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14 Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture,15 to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost.’16 In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Such observations amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s philosophical essay *The Order of Evils*. In this book Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility.17

### Multilat

Linearity fails

Bernstein et al 2000 Steven Bernstein, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein and Steven Weber, University of Toronto, The Ohio State University, University of Toronto and University of California at Berkeley. “God Gave Physics the Easy Problems” European Journal of International Relations 2000; 6; 43

A deep irony is embedded in the history of the scientific study of international relations. Recent generations of scholars separated policy from theory to gain an intellectual distance from decision-making, in the belief that this would enhance the 'scientific' quality of their work. But five decades of well-funded efforts to develop theories of international relations have produced precious little in the way of useful, high confidence results. Theories abound, but few meet **the most relaxed** 'scientific' tests of validity. Even the most robust generalizations or laws we can state - war is more likely between neighboring states, weaker states are less likely to attack stronger states - **are close to trivial**, have important exceptions, and for the most part stand outside any consistent body of theory. A generation ago, we might have excused our performance on the grounds that we were a young science still in the process of defining problems, developing analytical tools and collecting data. This excuse is neither credible nor sufficient; there is no reason to suppose that another 50 years of well-funded research would result in anything resembling a valid theory in the Popperian sense. We suggest that **the nature, goals and criteria for judging social science theory should be rethought**, if theory is to be more helpful in understanding the real world. We begin by justifying our pessimism, both conceptually and empirically, and argue that the quest for *predictive* theory rests on a mistaken analogy between physical and social phenomena. Evolutionary biology is a more productive analogy for social science. We explore the value of this analogy in its 'hard' and 'soft' versions, and examine the implications of both for theory and research in international relations.2 We develop the case for forward 'tracking' of international relations on the basis of local and general knowledge as an alternative to backward-looking attempts to build deductive, nomothetic theory. We then apply this strategy to some emerging trends in international relations. This article is not a nihilistic diatribe against 'modern' conceptions of social science. Rather, it is a plea for constructive humility in the current context of attraction to deductive logic, falsifiable hypothesis and large-n statistical 'tests' of narrow propositions. We propose a practical alternative for social scientists to pursue in addition, and in a complementary fashion, to 'scientific' theory-testing. *Newtonian Physics: A Misleading Model* Physical and chemical laws make two kinds of predictions. Some phenomena - the trajectories of individual planets - can be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty. Only a few variables need to be taken into account and they can be measured with precision. Other mechanical problems, like the break of balls on a pool table, while subject to deterministic laws, are inherendy unpredictable because of their complexity. Small differences in the lay of the table, the nap of the felt, the curvature of each ball and where they make contact, amplify the variance of each collision and lead to what appears as a near random distribution of balls. Most predictions in science are probabilistic, like the freezing point of liquids, the expansion rate of gases and all chemical reactions. Point predictions appear possible only because of the large numbers of units involved in interactions. In the case of nuclear decay or the expansion of gases, we are talking about *trillions* of atoms and molecules. In international relations, even more than in other domains of social science, it is often **impossible** to assign metrics to what we think are relevant variables (Coleman, 1964: especially Chapter 2). The concepts of **polarity**, relative power and the **balance of power** are among the most widely used independent variables, **but there are no commonly accepted definitions or measures** for them. Yet without consensus on definition and measurement, almost every statement or hypothesis will have too much wiggle room to be 'tested' decisively against evidence. What we take to be dependent variables fare little better. Unresolved controversies rage over the definition and evaluation of **deterrence outcomes**, and about the criteria for **democratic** **governance** and their application to specific countries at different points in their history. Differences in coding for even a few cases have significant implications for tests of theories of deterrence or of the democratic peace (Lebow and Stein, 1990; Chan, 1997). The lack of consensus about terms and their measurement is **not merely the result of** intellectual anarchy or **sloppiness** - although the latter cannot entirely be dismissed. Fundamentally, **it has more to do with the arbitrary nature of the concepts themselves.** Key terms in physics, like mass, temperature and velocity, refer to aspects of the physical universe that we cannot directly observe. However, they are embedded in theories with deductive implications that have been verified through empirical research. Propositions containing these terms are legitimate assertions about reality because their truth-value can be assessed. Social science theories are for the most part built on **'idealizations'**, that is, on concepts that cannot be anchored to observable phenomena through rules of correspondence. Most of these terms (e.g. rational actor, balance of power) are not descriptions of reality but **implicit 'theories'** about actors and **contexts that do not exist** (Hempel, 1952; Rudner, 1966; Gunnell, 1975; Moe, 1979; Searle, 1995: 68-72). The inevitable differences in interpretation of these concepts lead to different predictions in some contexts, and these outcomes may eventually produce widely varying futures (Taylor, 1985: 55). **If** problems of definition, measurement and coding could be resolved, we **would still find it** difficult, if not **impossible, to construct large enough samples** of comparable cases to permit statistical analysis. It is now almost generally accepted that in the analysis of the causes of wars, the **variation across time and the complexity of the interaction** among putative causes make the likelihood of a general theory **extraordinarily low**. Multivariate theories run into the problem of negative degrees of freedom, yet international relations rarely generates data sets in the high double digits. Where larger samples do exist, they often group together cases that differ from one another in theoretically important ways.3 Complexity in the form of multiple causation and equifinality can also make simple statistical comparisons misleading. But it is hard to elaborate more sophisticated statistical tests until one has a deeper baseline understanding of the nature of the phenomenon under investigation, as well as the categories and variables that make up candidate causes (Geddes, 1990: 131-50; Lustick, 1996: 505-18; Jervis, 1997). Wars - to continue with the same example - are similar to chemical and nuclear reactions in that they have underlying and immediate causes. **Even when all the underlying conditions are present**, these processes generally require a catalyst to begin. Chain reactions are triggered by the decay of atomic nuclei. Some of the neutrons they emit strike other nuclei prompting them to fission and emit more neutrons, which strike still more nuclei. Physicists can calculate how many kilograms of Uranium 235 or Plutonium at given pressures are necessary to produce a chain reaction. They can take it for granted that if a 'critical mass' is achieved, a chain reaction will follow. This is because trillions of atoms are present, and at any given moment enough of them will decay to provide the neutrons needed to start the reaction. In a large enough sample, catalysts will be present in a statistical sense. **Wars involve relatively few actors.** Unlike the weak force responsible for nuclear decay, their catalysts are probably **not inherent properties** of the units. Catalysts may or may not be present, and their **potentially random distribution** relative to underlying causes makes it **difficult to predict when or if an appropriate catalyst will occur**. If in the course of time underlying conditions change, reducing basic incentives for one or more parties to use force, catalysts that would have triggered war will no longer do so. This uncertain and evolving relationship between underlying and immediate causes **makes point prediction extraordinarily difficult**. **It also makes more general statements about the causation of war problematic**, since we have **no way of knowing** what wars would have occurred in the presence of appropriate catalysts. It is probably impossible to define the universe of would-be wars or to construct a representative sample of them. Statistical inference requires knowledge about the state of independence of cases, but in a practical sense that knowledge is often **impossible to obtain in the analysis of international relations**.

### Transition

**Even if any single step is possible, terrorists have to succeed at every step – it’s statistically impossible**

**Mueller 9** - John Mueller, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center  
Professor of Political Science30 April 2009 “THE ATOMIC TERRORIST?” <http://www.icnnd.org/research/Mueller_Terrorism.pdf>

In an article on the prospects for atomic terrorism, Bill Keller of *The New York Times* suggests that “the best reason for thinking it won’t happen is that it hasn’t happened yet,” and that, he worries, “is terrible logic.”33 However, “logic” aside, there is another quite good reason for thinking it won’t happen: the task is incredibly difficult. I have arrayed a lengthy set of obstacles confronting the would-be atomic terrorist. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if often with great difficulty, surmount each obstacle—that doing so in each case is “not impossible.”34 But it is vital to point out that, while it may be “not impossible” to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Even the very alarmed Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier contend that the atomic terrorists’ task “would clearly be among the most difficult types of attack to carry out” or “one of the most difficult missions a terrorist group could hope to try.” But, stresses the CIA’s George Tenet, a terrorist atomic bomb is “possible” or “not beyond the realm of possibility.”35 Accordingly, it might be useful to take a stab at estimating just how “difficult” the atomic terrorists’ task, in aggregate, is—that is, how far from the fringe of the “realm of possibility” it might be. Most discussions of atomic terrorism deal in a rather piecemeal fashion with the subject--focusing separately on individual tasks such as procuring HEU or assembling a device or transporting it. However, as the Gilmore Commission, a special advisory panel to the President and Congress, stresses, setting off a nuclear device capable of producing mass destruction presents not only “Herculean challenges,” but it requires that a whole series of steps be accomplished: obtaining enough fissile material, designing a weapon “that will bring that mass together in a tiny fraction of a second,” and figuring out some way to deliver the thing. And it emphasizes that these merely constitute “the minimum requirements.” If each is not fully met, the result is not simply a less powerful weapon, but one that can’t produce any significant nuclear yield at all or can’t be delivered.36 Following this perspective, an approach that seems appropriate is to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome by a terrorist group in order to carry out the task of producing, transporting, and then successfully detonating an improvised nuclear device. Table 1 attempts to do this, and it arrays some 20 of these—*all* of which must be surmounted by the atomic aspirant. Actually, it would be quite possible to come up with a longer list: in the interests of keeping the catalogue of hurdles down to a reasonable number, some of the entries are actually collections of tasks and could be divided into two or three or more. For example, number 5 on the list requires that heisted highly-enriched uranium be neither a scam nor part of a sting nor of inadequate quality due to insider incompetence; but this hurdle could as readily be rendered as three separate ones. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists effectively *must* go though a exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do so, they are likely to find their prospects daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. Assigning and calculating probabilities The discussion thus far has followed a qualitative approach: synthesizing a considerable amount of material to lay out the route a terrorist group must take to acquire and detonate an atomic bomb in the most likely scenario. It seems to me that this exercise by itself suggests the almost breathtaking enormity of the difficulties facing the would-be atomic terrorist. This conclusion can be reinforced by a quantitative assessment. Assigning a probability that terrorists will be able to overcome each barrier is, of course, a tricky business, and any such exercise should be regarded as rather tentative and exploratory, or perhaps simply as illustrative—though it is done all the time in cost/benefit analysis. One might begin a quantitative approach by adopting probability estimates that purposely, and heavily, bias the case in the terrorists’ favor. In my view, this would take place if it is assumed that the terrorists have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles displayed in Table 1, though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are surely much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million, specifically 1,048,576. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion—specifically 3,486,784,401. What they would be at the (still entirely realistic) level of one in ten boggles the mind. Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive.

**Our statistics are for the most plausible scenarios-anything else is even less likely.**

Mueller 8, John, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Ohio State, 1/1/ (<http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF>)

These odds are for the most plausible scenario by means of which a terrorist group might gain a bomb: constructing one from HEU obtained through illicit means. As noted, there are other routes to a bomb: stealing a fully constructed one (or the HEU needed to make one) or being given one as a gift by a nuclear state. However, as also noted, those routes are generally conceded, even by most alarmists, to be considerably less likely than the one outlined in Table 1 to be successful for the terrorists. Additionally, if there were a large number of concerted efforts, policing and protecting would presumably become easier because the aspirants would be exposing themselves repeatedly and would likely be stepping all over each other in their quest to access the right stuff. Also, the difficulties for the atomic terrorists are likely to increaseover time because of much enhanced protective and policing efforts by self-interested governments--there is considerable agreement, for example, that Russian nuclear materials are much more adequately secured than they were ten or fifteen years ago (Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 257). Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive.

Terrorists aren’t pursuing nukes

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If one were to read the most recent unclassified report to Congress on the acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions, it does have a section on CBRN terrorism (note, not WMD terrorism). The intelligence community has a very toned down statement that says “several terrorist groups … probably remain interested in [CBRN] capabilities, but not necessarily in all four of those capabilities. … mostly focusing on low-level chemicals and toxins.” They’re talking about terrorists getting industrial chemicals and making ricin toxin, not nuclear weapons. And yes, Ms. Squassoni, it is primarily al Qaeda that the U.S. government worries about, no one else. The trend of worldwide terrorism continues to remain in the realm of conventional attacks. In 2010, there were more than 11,500 terrorist attacks, affecting about 50,000 victims including almost 13,200 deaths. None of them were caused by CBRN hazards. Of the 11,000 terrorist attacks in 2009, none were caused by CBRN hazards. Of the 11,800 terrorist attacks in 2008, none were caused by CBRN hazards.